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I.

Introduction and Summary of Conclusions
A. Issues
This memorandum analyzes the competing interests involved in the

surrender of the accused by domestic states to the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (Tribunal). In this analysis, the Tribunal’s primacy status,
the obligations of the States to cooperate with the Tribunal, and the principles of
concurrent and universal jurisdiction will be evaluated. In addition, this
memorandum will look into the legal arguments that can be made to confirm the
Tribunal‘s priority right if a situation arises in which the Tribunal and other States
wish to invoke their jurisdiction over the accused.1
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. Despite objections from other States, the Tribunal’s
primacy status takes precedence over other jurisdictional
considerations.
Although the States offer fairly compelling, jurisdictional arguments
against the Tribunal’s primacy, these challenges do not invalidate the Tribunal’s

The Prosecution Counsel for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
anticipates that possible problems may arise when the Tribunal and other nation
States wish to exercise their jurisdiction and prosecute the same suspect.
Possible case scenarios to consider include an exercise of universal jurisdiction
by Belgium or an assertion of jurisdiction by Switzerland which is not a party to
the United Nations. With this in mind, the Prosecution counsel has asked for a
report which investigates whether or not the Tribunal can prevail in these
situations if this issue arises before a competent court. E-mail from Andra
Mobberley, Prosecution Counsel, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, to
Agnes Escurel, Student, New England School of Law (Oct. 6, 2001 10:37:45 EST)
(copy on file with Prof. Michael Scharf). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 26.]
1

1

right to supercede any national court’s jurisdiction. Not only is the Tribunal’s
primacy established under statute, the willingness of most States to surrender
the accused to the Tribunal has effectively cemented the validity of the
Tribunal’s priority right.2 In addition, States are required to cooperate with the
Tribunal in the surrendering the accused in accordance with Article 28 of the
Rwanda Statute.3 Even non-UN members are required to cooperate with the
Tribunal pursuant to a provision under Article 2(6) of the UN Charter. And since
all states are obligated to comply with the Tribunal’s requests, the Tribunal
should still prevail in cases where its primacy is challenged.

2. Although the legal case on primacy is clear, the Security
Council’s failure to impose sanctions on non-cooperative
countries makes it more likely that other countries will
challenge the Tribunal’s primacy.
While there is no question as to the legal argument for the Tribunal’s
primacy, in terms of practicality of acquiring accused persons from recalcitrant
States, the Tribunal has a much harder battle. According to the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence for the Rwanda Tribunal, a State that fails to cooperate
with the requests of the Tribunal will be reported to the Security Council which

2

Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity : Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and
International Criminal Tribunals, 23 Yale J. Int’l L. 383 (1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 18.] In Prosecutor v. Tadic, which was the very first case tried before the International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, Peter Wilkitzi, the German Federal Ministry of Justice told the Tribunal
that Germany had accepted its primacy. Tadic’s lawyer also gave no objections against transferring the
proceedings from Germany to the Tribunal. MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE (1997). [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13.]
3
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, annexed to S.C. Res. 955., reprinted in
GABRIELLE K. MCDONALD AND OLIVIA SWAAK-GOLDMAN, SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 311 (2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]
2

will then in turn impose sanctions on that country. However, despite pleas from
judges and lawyers to the Security Council to impose such sanctions, the
Security Council has repeatedly failed to do so. This lack of enforcement on the
part of the Security Council hampers the Tribunal’s primacy status and its
chances on procuring suspects from uncooperative countries. As a result, the
Tribunal must take a more aggressive, but diplomatic stance in promoting
cooperation of all States to surrender accused persons. One approach would be
to enlist the help of other countries in applying economic and diplomatic
pressure upon States that refuse to comply with their obligations. Another
approach that in order to reduce conflicts between States and thereby promote
their cooperation with the Tribunal. The Tribunal could perhaps restrict its use
of primacy to cases which involve the following: (1) high level officials; (2)
crimes of mass atrocities; and (3) novel issues of international law for which the
Tribunal should create a uniform standard.

II.

Factual Background
Definitions
The process of surrender or transfer of a suspect to the Tribunal begins

when the Prosecutor at the Tribunal submits a request to the State to obtain
custody of the accused. In cases of surrender the accused is already in the
custody of the national authorities whereas in transfer, national authorities have
acted in accordance with the Tribunal’s order to effect the constructive custody

3

of the accused to the Tribunal.4 According to the Statute, the Prosecutor may
seek orders to gain custody of accused persons in either of the above situations.5
However, the success of these proceedings depends greatly on the
cooperation of the States with the Tribunal. Although the Statute creates an
obligation for the States to comply with Tribunal’s requests, they have not
always adhered to it citing their own national interests. So there is cause for
concern that problems could arise in the future if and when a State and the
Tribunal both wish to exercise jurisdiction over the suspect. Battles over
defendants could pose a threat to the power and efficiency of the Tribunal. With
that in mind, several arguments are outlined below to evaluate how to approach
such non-compliance by the States.

GEOFF GILBERT, TRANSNATIONAL FUGITIVE OFFENDERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
EXTRADITION AND OTHER MECHANISMS 493 n. 1568 (1998). The terms “surrender” and
“transfer” are used in lieu of “extradition” to describe the means of bringing the accused
to trial. The rules of extradition are inapplicable in these situations since they are not
expressly incorporated in the Statutes, Rules or domestic legislation regarding the
Tribunal. Id. at 49. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]
5
Article 28 of the Rwanda Tribunal Statute provides as follows: Article 28: Cooperation and judicial assistance. 1. States shall co-operate with the International
Tribunal for Rwanda in the investigation and prosecution of persons accused of
committing serious violations of international humanitarian law. 2. States shall comply
without undue delay with any request for assistance or an order issued by a Trial
Chamber, including, but not limited to: (a) The identification and location of persons;
(b) The taking of testimony and the production of evidence; (c) The service of
documents;
(d) The arrest or detention of persons; (e) The surrender or the
transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal for Rwanda. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]
4

4

III. Legal Discussion
A. An Obligation to Surrender
As a construct under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the
Rwanda Tribunal requires that States which are a party to the United Nations
comply with the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
Security Council Resolution 955 which created the Rwanda Tribunal states that:
all States shall cooperate fully with the International Tribunal and its
organs in accordance with the present resolution and the Statute of the
International Tribunal and that consequently all States shall take any
measures necessary under their domestic law to implement the provisions
of the present resolution and the Statute, including the obligation of
States to comply with requests for assistance or orders issued by a Trial
Chamber under Article 28.6
This language in the Security Council Resolution demonstrates the drafters’
intention to create a broad obligation to cooperate with the Rwanda Tribunal and
eliminate any basis for States to refuse the surrender of wanted suspects.7
Article 28 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda even
stipulates that “States shall comply without undue delay with any request for
assistance or an order issued by the Trial Chamber.”8 Should any state notified

Robert Kushen and Kenneth J. Harris, Current Development: Surrender of
Fugitives by the United States to the War: Crimes Tribunals for Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, 90 A.J.I.L. 510, 512 (1996). [Reproduced in the accompanying

6

notebook at Tab 35.]
7
Id. This obligation is also provided for in paragraph 4 of Security Council
Resolution 827 which established the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia. Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 35.]
8
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda , supra note 3, at 318.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3.] U.S. Ambassador to the
5

of a deferral request by the Tribunal not respond satisfactorily in sixty days, the
Trial Chamber may request the President to report the noncompliance to the
Security Council which will presumably impose sanctions.9
Although the Security Council should impose sanctions on countries who
fail to comply with the Tribunal, it has never undertaken any actions against
countries that violate their obligations. In 1996 when the Yugoslavia Tribunal
reported to the Security Council that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)
repeatedly refused to arrest and transfer individuals that it had requested, the
Security Council condemned the FRY’s failure to comply but declined to impose
any sanctions.10 The Deputy Prosecutor of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, Graham
Blewitt warned that the Security Council’s failure to impose sanctions would
encourage the FRY’s refusal to cooperate.11 Blewitt’s prediction proved to be
true. Three years later the FRY refused the Tribunal’s request for the of three
Serb officers.12 The chief judge at the Yugoslav Tribunal, Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald made two personal appeals and four in writing to the Security Council
United Nations, Madeline Albright commented on the obligations of every
country to cooperate with the Tribunal. She warned, “Unless [the countries]
comply with their obligations, the parties to the conflict cannot expect to reap
the benefits of peace.” Michael P. Scharf, The Tools For Enforcing International
Criminal Justice in the New Millenium: Lessons From the Yugoslavia Tribunal, 49
DePaul L. Rev. 925 (2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
32].
9
PAUL J. MAGNARELLA, JUSTICE IN AFRICA: RWANDA’S GENOCIDE, ITS COURTS, AND
THE UN CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 45 (2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 15.]
10

Scharf, supra note 6, at 943. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
12
Id. The three Serbs, Mile Mrksic, Veselin Sljivancanin and Mirslav Radic who were also known as the
“Vukovar Three” were wanted on charges for the killing of 260 unarmed men at a farm in Vukovar in
11

6

to compel Serbia to turn over the officers.13 Her pleas went unanswered and no
sanctions were imposed upon Serbia. This failure of the Security Council to
enforce measures undermines the Tribunal’s authority and poses a serious
problem for the Tribunal in acquiring accused persons from reluctant countries.
If countries know that there will be no repercussions for their non-compliance,
they will have no incentive to cooperate with the Tribunal.
However, in accordance with Chapter VII obligations of the UN Charter, all
UN members are required to cooperate with the Rwanda Tribunal in the
surrender of suspects regardless of whether or not they have ratified the
Genocide Convention. Non-UN member states can choose whether or not to
cooperate and that poses potential problems for the Tribunal’s primacy.14 There
is also no universal agreement which provides for the reciprocal cooperation of
States in these types of matters.15 While this may be the case, the international
community has affirmed that “refusal by States to co-operate in the arrest,
extradition, trial and punishment of persons guilty of war crimes and crimes
against humanity is contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations and to general recognized norms of international law.”16
Additionally under Article 2(6) of the UN Charter, non-member States are
1991. Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
13
Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32]. In her departing speech, McDonald
criticized the Security Council for ignoring its duty saying, “The Council has done nothing.” Id.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32].

PAUL J. MAGNARELLA, supra note 9, at 46. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 15.]
14

15

MICHAEL P. SCHARF AND VIRGINIA MORRIS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
(1998). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14.]

7

required to act in accordance with decisions that are necessary for the
maintenance of international peace and security.17 And that includes
cooperating with the Rwanda Tribunal through the surrender of suspects.

B. Primacy of the Tribunal
The drafters for both the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals designed the
Tribunals’ primacy provisions mainly to prevent States from conducting sham
proceedings to absolve their own nationals.18 The drafters of the Tribunals, wary
of local judicial proceedings and the possible unfairness in the prosecutions of
national adversaries, implemented the primacy provision so as to not replicate
these injustices.19 But while primacy does not allow the appeal of domestic
convictions to the Rwanda Tribunal, the need for legitimacy in prosecuting
crimes of war has warranted the Rwanda Tribunal’s primacy status.
Also, granting the Rwanda Tribunal primacy over national courts prevents
multiple courts from exercising jurisdiction over the accused person at the same
time.20 If courts of different nations decided to seek the prosecution of the
accused simultaneously, there could be problems of gathering evidence due to
16
17

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14.]
Id. at 638. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14.]

RUTH WEDGWOOD, NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMES 406
(2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 16.]
19
Id. In one notorious national prosecution, the local courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina
initially rejected to suspend the execution of the death sentence for a Serb Soldier who
was wrongly convicted. Sretko Damjanovic had been found guilty for the murder of two
Muslim brothers who later turned up alive. Id. And since 1996, the Bosnian Serb
government has been conducting an unauthorized trial in absentia of President
Izetbegovic. Id. at 407. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 16.]
18

8

the different investigative procedures of each country, evidence could be
destroyed or damaged if it were used in multiple trials, witnesses may become
reluctant to testify, and courts seeking to prosecute a defendant from a rival
nation would raise questions of the impartiality of the judicial proceedings.21
In addition, primacy of jurisdiction is necessary to ensure an effective
deterrent against leaders and organizers of the genocide. Ordinarily, before they
can be prosecuted by their own national authorities, leaders of crimes flee and
take refuge in other countries willing to shield them.22 When that happens, the
prosecuting State may experience great difficulty in retrieving these self-exiled
leaders. In these circumstances, an international tribunal will presumably have
more success than national authorities in gaining custody of the defendants. As
a result, effective deterrence at the leadership level may possibly only be
achieved through the threat of prosecution before the Rwanda Tribunal.23 Also
there is the premise that grave offenses against mankind like genocide demand
to be heard before an international entity in order to give humanity a voice.24
Although these rationales deserve consideration, some critics decry the
20
21

Bartram S. Brown, supra note 2, at 383 (1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 18.]
Id. at 398. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 18.]

Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of
Rwanda, 7 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 349, 368 (1997). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 25.]
23
Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 25.]
24
Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 25.] In his opening
speech for the Prosecution at the international tribunal at Nuremburg Robert H.
Jackson stated, “The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been
so calculated, so malignant and so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate
their being ignored, because it cannot survive their being repeated.” MICHAEL P.
SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE xiii (1997). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
22

9

international community’s interest in denouncing international crime where the
perpetrator is a leader as not sufficiently significant to warrant a stratified
system for the distribution of defendants. Additionally, this type of system
exhibits some inherent inconsistencies: (1) trials of the Tribunal will tend to be
more favorable to the defendants than in a national forum-no death penalty; (2)
the international prisons of the Tribunal have better conditions than that of the
national courts; and (3) Due process for defendants is of great concern for the
Rwanda Tribunal whereas many times this is not the case in national courts.25

C. Challenges to the Tribunal’s Primacy: Jurisdictional
Considerations
1. Concurrent Jurisdiction
Article 8 of the Rwanda Statute states that “the International Tribunal for
Rwanda and national courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute
persons for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the
territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens for such violations committed in the
territory of neighboring States.”26 However, the ICTR “shall have primacy over
national courts of all States.”27
In the case of Prosecutor v. Bernard Ntuyahaga, the Prosecutor’s
Tab 13.]
25
Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 25.]
26
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, annexed to S.C. Res. 955., reprinted
in GABRIELLE K. MCDONALD AND OLIVIA SWAAK-GOLDMAN, SUBSTANTIVE AND
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 311 (2000). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]
10

withdrawal of Ntuyahaga’s indictment blurred the lines of primacy and
concurrent jurisdiction. The motion was unprecedented in the Rwanda Tribunal.
In this case, the prosecutor used the principle of concurrent jurisdiction provided
in Article 8(1) of the Statute to argue the withdrawal of the indictment.28 In its
argument, the prosecution stated, “It is our submission that this case falls into
the category of cases most appropriate for the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction
by Belgium which has instituted criminal investigations against the accused since
1994” and that “concurrent jurisdiction is not about competing or antagonistic
claims. It is about universal jurisdiction for the crimes in question.”29 Mr.
Othman Chande, a senior Prosecution attorney for the Tribunal submitted that
“primacy of jurisdiction ought not be construed as monopoly of jurisdiction.”30
27

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]
Prosecutor v. Ntuyahaga, ICTR-98-40-T(18 March 1999).
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Ntuyuhaga/decisions/withdraw.htm.
(visited Oct. 10, 2001). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
7.] Rule 51 which provides for the withdrawal of indictment states as follows:
(A) The Prosecutor may withdraw an indictment, without prior leave, at any time
before its confirmation, but thereafter, until the initial appearance of the accused
before a Trial Chamber pursuant to Rule 62, only with leave of the Judge who
confirmed it but, in exceptional circumstances, by leave of a Judge assigned by
the President. At or after such initial appearance an indictment may only be
withdrawn by leave granted by a Trial Chamber pursuant to Rule 73. (B) The
withdrawal of the indictment shall by promptly notified to the suspect or the
accused and to the counsel of the suspect or accused. International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda: Rules of Procedure and Evidence. http://www.ictr.org
(visited Oct. 14, 2001). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]
29
Press Release, The Prosecutor v. Ntuyahaga <http://www.ictr.org/
ENGLISH/PRESSREL/1999/update13.htm. [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 47.]
30
Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 47.] In July 1998, Belgium sent an
extradition request to Tanzania after Ntuyahaga surrendered himself to the Tribunal.
Belgium based its warrant of arrest on Ntuyahaga’s involvement in the deaths of 10
Belgian soldiers in UNAMIR, the willful killing of the then Prime Minister of Rwanda,
28
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The Belgian Government agreed with that sentiment and stated that the
cooperation of the member States with the Tribunal set forth in the Statute
necessarily implies a reciprocal cooperation of the Tribunal with the States.31 Eric
David, appearing on behalf of the Kingdom of Belgium as an amicus curiae
argued that the principle of concurrent jurisdiction in the Statute “is the rule and
primacy of the Tribunal over national courts, the exception.”32 This statement
from the Belgian lawyer indicates that Belgium does not agree with how the
Tribunal asserts its primacy and that perhaps it should only be reserved for
special cases. Belgium appears to interpret the language in the Statute in the
exercise of jurisdiction between the Tribunal and the States as complementary,
not as one judicial body superceding the other. However, the Trial Chamber
which eventually granted the Prosecutor‘s request, concluded in its opinion that
the question of concurrent jurisdiction cannot be used by the Prosecutor for the
withdrawal of an indictment.33 While it wanted to emphasize that the Rwanda

Mrs. Agathe Uwilingiyimana, and crimes against certain other Rwandans. Id.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 47.]
31
Prosecutor v. Ntuyahaga, supra note 28, at 2. [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 7.] Defense counsel, Mr. Georges Komlavi Amegadjie from
Togo opposed the prosecution’s motion and urged for Ntuyahaga’s acquittal. He
stated that because the ICTR is a United Nations body, “the Prosecution should
not act as a rubber stamp for some national jurisdictions.” Amegadjie added
that the Statute of the ICTR does not provide for the ICTR to hand over an
accused person to a national jurisdiction. Press Release, supra note 20.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 47.]
32
Press Release, supra note 29. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 47.]
33
Prosecutor v. Ntuyahaga, supra note 28, at 2 [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 7.] In its decision, Trial Chamber I reasoned the Prosecutor’s
motion for withdrawal for indictment was well founded not on the reason of
concurrent jurisdiction but that under Rule 51 the Prosecutor has the sole
responsibility for prosecutions and has the right to decide whether or not to
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Tribunal encourages the exercise of universal jurisdiction to prosecute crimes of
such a severe nature, the Trial Chamber still maintained the Rwanda Tribunal’s
primacy by concluding that the “deferral of investigations and proceedings by the
Tribunal to any national jurisdiction, is not provided for.”34

2. Universal Jurisdiction
The universality principle assumes that the crimes committed are so
universally recognized and condemned by all nations of the world that any
nation may bring a prosecution of the perpetrators. This principle permits all
states to apply their laws in these circumstances “even if it … occurred outside
its territory, even if it has been perpetrated by a non-national, and even if its
national have not been harmed by it ….”35 The Geneva Conventions which were
entered into force in 1950 recognized the principle of universal jurisdiction to
authorize the courts of signatory states to prosecute grave breaches of the
Conventions.36 With universal jurisdiction, any state can try an offender but
jurisdiction is only applicable to a limited number of crimes. In customary
proceed with the indictment. Therefore, the Prosecutor may apply for leave to
withdraw an indictment at any stage of the proceedings. Id. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 7.]
34
Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7.] In its decision the
Trial Chamber stated that under the provisions of the Statute and the Rules, it
does not have jurisdiction to order the release of a person who is not longer
under indictment into the custody of another state, even the Host state. Id.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7.]
35

Leila N. Sadat, Redefining Universal Jurisdiction, 35 New Eng. L. Rev. 241 (2001). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 24.]
36

GEOFF GILBERT, TRANSNATIONAL FUGITIVE OFFENDERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
EXTRADITION AND OTHER MECHANISMS 406 (1998). [Reproduced in accompanying
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international law, these crimes include piracy, slave trade and traffic in children
and women. It is also includes genocide, crimes against humanity and war
crimes.37 However, very few courts have invoked universal jurisdiction which
seems to refute the suggestion of some scholars who assert that universal
jurisdiction has “passed into customary law and should be recognized as
available to any country that wishes.”38
A possible challenge to third states that wish to invoke universal
jurisdiction in opposition to the Tribunal’s request for the surrender of the
accused is that there is no provision for universal jurisdiction over crimes of
genocide in the Genocide Convention, although critics have argued otherwise.39
However, opponents argue that such prosecutions of crimes of humanity are

notebook at Tab 9.]
37
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 60
(2001). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17.] Piracy was the first widely
accepted crime of universal jurisdiction because it consisted of heinous acts of violence
or depredation committed against the vessels and nationals of numerous states. Michael
P. Scharf, Application of Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction to Nationals of Non-Party
States, 35 New. Eng. L. Rev. 363 (2001). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
30.]
38
GEOFF GILBERT, supra note 36. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]
39
Thomas Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 A.J.I.L.
554, 568 (1995).[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 37.] The
provision for universal jurisdiction was proposed but rejected during negotiations
of the Genocide Convention. It was strongly opposed by France, the Soviet
Union and the United States. Madeline H. Morris, Universal Jurisdiction in a
Divided World, 35 New. Eng. L. Rev. 337 (2001). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 26.] In Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, the Israeli
Supreme Court stated that “every sovereign [s]tate may exercise its existing
powers within the limits of customary law….” Michael P. Scharf, The ICC’s

Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of Non-Party States: A Critique of the U.S.
Position, 64 Law & Contemp. Prob. 67 (2001). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 31.]
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now widely accepted and so too should the crime of genocide.40 But while that
may be the trend, a Commentary to the Third Geneva Convention points out
that, “The Contracting Parties … should at least insert in their legislation a
general clause providing for the punishment of other breaches.”41 One country
which has followed up on that notion is Belgium. In 1993 Belgium enacted
Rimes de droit international which conferred upon the Belgian Courts criminal
jurisdiction over certain breaches of the Geneva Conventions, Protocol I and
Protocol II.42 They have since utilized the principle of universal jurisdiction and
have issued international arrest warrants against persons involved in the
Rwandan conflict.43

3. Territorial Jurisdiction--Rwanda
In accordance with the general practice of international law, States
holding the accused should transfer the fugitive to the State with territorial
jurisdiction.44 However, allowing the national courts in Rwanda to prosecute the
accused versus in the Rwanda Tribunal would create a lack of neutrality in these
prosecutions. Governments are usually harsher in punishment when their
Thomas Meron, supra note 39, at 568. [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 37.]
41
Thomas Meron, supra note 39, at 568. [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 37.]
42
Id. at 576. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 37.]
43
Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 37.]
44
GEOFF GILBERT, supra note 36, at 403. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 9.]
40
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citizens have been attacked and there would most likely be a broad public
sentiment to quickly condemn the accused without a fair trial and thus it would
encourage the danger of victor’s justice, personal partiality and bias.
Tensions have arisen between Rwanda and the Tribunal over the Rwanda
Tribunal‘s provisions. Rwanda did not agree with the final draft of the Rwanda
Statute or the Tribunal’s location in Tanzania and had wanted the temporal
jurisdiction to cover crimes as early as 1990 since the genocide was planned 3
years in advance.45 Also, Rwanda has argued that the Tribunal uses the Statute
to compete with it for suspects in third countries.46 In a formal position paper
that it sent to the UN entitled The Position of the Government of the Republic of

Rwanda on the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the Rwandan
government voiced concerns about the Tribunal’s procedures to obtain
suspects.47 In one part of its report, Rwanda stated that the prosecutors “have
not determined policy as to whom the tribunal should pursue. They have never
indicated the kind of cases they wish to prosecute before the Tribunal and those

45

HOWARD BALL, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES AND GENOCIDE 172 (1999). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]

46

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]

47

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10.] Other concerns that the
Rwandan government raised about the Tribunal included the poor organization of the
ICTR, the personnel problems of the ICTR, the ICTR’s conduct of investigations, the
prosecutor’s interpretation of the ICTR mandate, and the attitude of the Prosecutor’s
Office toward the Rwandan government and its people. At the conclusion of its report
Rwanda recommended changes to the ICTR which called for: (1) an independent
Prosecutor for the ICTR; (2) moving the ICTR to Kigali, Rwanda; (3) strengthening the
powers of the prosecutorial staff of the ICTR; (4) recruiting more qualified personnel for
the ICTR; and (5) improving cooperative actions with the Rwandan government and
legal authorities. Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]
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they expect to be tried by national courts … They proceed on an ad hoc basis.”48
Also conflicts over the exercise of jurisdiction between Rwanda and the ICTR
have not been set out in any type of agreement or mutual understanding. Any
conflicts that have arisen have been resolved on an ad hoc basis.49
In response to their dissatisfaction with the new Tribunal, on September
1, 1996 Rwanda established the Rwandan Organic Law on the Organizations of
Prosecutions for Offenses Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes against
Humanity Committed since October 1, 1990.50 Rwanda designed the law to
expedite domestic trials and encourage refugee Hutus to return to Rwanda.51
Although the Statute gives the ICTR priority on who to indict and try the new
Tutsi leaders in Rwanda also decided to charge and try the Hutu leaders, thereby
creating tension between the ICTR and the Rwandan government.52 Under these
laws, leaders and organizers of genocide who were found guilty were given the

48

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]
Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of
Rwanda, 7 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 349 (1997). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 25.]
50
HOWARD BALL, supra note 45, at 184. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 10.] Suspects under this law fell into four categories: (1) leaders and
organizers of the genocide and perpetrators who committed heinous murders
and/or sexual torture; (2) all others who were found guilty of murder; (3) Hutu
who committed “grave assaults” that did not end with murder of the victim; and
(4) all those who committed property damages in connection with the genocide.
Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]
51
Paul J. Magnarella, Expanding Frontiers of Humanitarian Law: The
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 9 Fla. J. Int’l L. 421 (1994).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34.]
52
HOWARD BALL, supra note 45, at 183. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 10.]
49
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death sentence.53 Defendants at the Rwanda Tribunal enjoy more favorable
treatment including escaping the death penalty, better prison conditions, and the
guarantee of due process safeguards.54 On December 27, 1996 Rwanda initiated
domestic trials for genocide and crimes against humanity in Kigali.55 Most
defendants did not have adequate counsel and usually guilt did not have to be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.56 In 1998 Rwanda executed 22 people by
firing squad.57
In contrast to Rwanda’s system of justice, the Rwanda Tribunal is not
authorized to impose the death penalty, consistent with its prohibition under the
Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR of 1989 which leads to an ironic
situation.58 One of the main purposes for establishing this Tribunal was to create
53

Id. at 184. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10.] Many international
human rights organizations along with the United States, the European Union and Pope
John Paul II argued against these executions and appealed to the Rwandan government
for clemency for the condemned but Rwanda rejected their requests. Id. at 185.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]
54
Madeline H. Morris, supra note 49. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 25.] In 1997 Amnesty International produced a report which described
the unfairness of the trials conducted in the Rwandan national courts. The
report pointed out that some defendants had trials which only lasted four hours,
defendants had no access to legal counsel and were denied the opportunity to
summon witness for their defense or cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses.
HOWARD BALL, supra note 43, at 186. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 10.]
55
Id. at 185. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]
56
Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10.] In reference to the
domestic trials in Rwanda, U.N. spokesperson Jose Luis Herrero stated that
“there is no such certainty of guilt” in these cases. Id. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]
57
Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10.] Foreign Minister
Anastase Gasana stated that the executions served “an educational and
pedagogical purpose. Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]
58
PAUL J. MAGNARELLA, JUSTICE IN AFRICA: RWANDA’S GENOCIDE, ITS COURTS, AND THE
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legitimacy in the process of prosecuting the accused and not turn it into a court
of personal retribution. However, such trials have already happened in Rwanda.
Since the Rwanda Tribunal gets to pick which cases it gets to prosecute, it
usually goes for the high standing leaders, leaving Rwanda the task of
prosecuting the subordinates.59 And since Rwanda has capital punishment and
the Rwanda Tribunal does not, it is highly plausible that those who were the
most responsible for the genocide crimes will receive a less harsh punishment
than those who did not have such an active role in the genocide.
It is important to note that Rwanda formally requested the creation of the
Tribunal so it voluntarily gave up some of its jurisdiction to the ICTR.60 Also
because Rwanda’s judiciary was devastated during the genocide, the Tribunal
was needed to carry out the necessary procedures to hold accountable the
people who were involved in the genocide.61 Ironically Rwanda’s delegation to
the Security Council cast the sole vote objecting to the establishment of the
ICTR.62
According to the Statute, Rwanda along with its neighbors are required to

UN CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 50 (2000). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
15.]
59
Id. at 55. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15.]
60
Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15.]
61
Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15.] Before the genocide
Rwanda had 750 judges, 87 prosecutors and 139 investigators. After the
genocide, only 244 judges, 14 prosecutors, and 39 investigators were left. Many
of these law enforcement figures left the country or were killed. HOWARD BALL,
supra note 43, at 183. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]
62
Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15.]
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surrender accused persons to the Rwanda Tribunal without a choice.63
And since the ICTR is basically expected to go after the leaders and the
organizers of the genocide, the Rwandan government and the ICTR have
clashed in their efforts to obtain suspects.64

4. State Sovereignty
Many states insist that their sovereignty gives them ultimate discretion on
how to deal with suspects wanted by the ICTR who threaten their security.65 A
basic principle of international law states that a nation has jurisdiction to
prosecute crimes committed within its territory.66 Since these crimes involve
violations of national law, a nation has an interest in applying their own type of
justice.67 However, States that sign onto the UN Charter, the Genocide
Convention, and other international agreements give up absolute sovereignty.68
Whether this will become an accepted principle of international law will depend
on State action and reaction and measures taken by the Security Council. As of
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, annexed to S.C. Res. 955.,
reprinted in GABRIELLE K. MCDONALD AND OLIVIA SWAAK-GOLDMAN, SUBSTANTIVE AND
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 311 (2000). [Reproduced in
accompanying at Tab 3.]
64
Madeline H. Morris, supra note 49, at 349 (1997). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 25.]
65
Thomas Meron, supra note 39. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 37.]
66
Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 37.]
67
Evo Popoff, Inconsistency and Impunity in International Human Rights Law:
63

Can the International Criminal Court Solve the Problems Raised by the Rwanda
and Augusto Pinochet Cases, 33 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 363, 370 (2001).

[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 19.]
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July 23, 2001 there have been thirty-eight arrests in Africa, eleven arrests in
Europe and one arrest in the United States for surrender to the Tribunal.69
These numbers seem to suggest that countries are complying with their
obligations to cooperate with the Tribunal in the surrender of accused persons
and therefore it has become a customary practice of international law.

IV.

Can the Tribunal Realistically Retain Its Primacy
Status?
A. Indications that the Tribunal may Prevail
1. Enactments of national legislation to comply with the

Tribunal

On January 24, 1995 the United States signed an agreement called the
Agreement on Surrender of Persons Between the Government of the United
States and the Tribunal to carry out its obligations under paragraph 2 of
Resolution 955.70 In 1996, the United States along with France, Germany and

68

Id. at 383 (2001). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 19.]
Coalition for International Justice, Who’s in Custody of the ICTR? (Jul. 23,
2001), available at http://www.cij.org/ictr/2pager2.htm. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 40.]
70
In the Matter of the Surrender of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, 1998 U.S. Dist.
69
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nine other states enacted legislation in order to fulfill their legal obligation under
Resolution 955 of the Security Council to surrender suspects charged with
violations of international humanitarian law.71 On February 10, 1996 Section
1342(a)(1) of Public Law was enacted to implement the Surrender Agreement.72
The United States utilized this legislation to serve as an example to other states
toward the fulfillment of their UN obligations and used the bilateral extradition
process as a model for creating a surrender framework.73 Although the United
States arrested Ntakirutimana on September 26, 1996 and Judge John Rainey
ordered Ntakirutimana’s surrender to the Tribunal on August 5, 1998, the
process was anything but smooth.74 The first magistrate judge denied surrender
on the basis of insufficient national legislation to carry out such procedures. The
surrender was only recently approved after the case was brought to another
federal judge.75 However, under the U.S. scheme for surrender there exists a
possibility for a denial of surrender. Under domestic law, the Secretary of State
LEXIS 22173 (Aug. 6, 1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 5.]
71
Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5.]
72
Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5.]
73

Robert Kushen and Kenneth J. Harris, supra note 4, at 515. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 35.]
74
HOWARD BALL, supra note 45, at 175. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
10.]
75
RUTH WEDGWOOD, supra note 16, at 409. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 16.] The first judge, Magistrate Notzon denied the
Government’s request for the surrender of Ntakirutimana for two reasons: (1)
extradition requires an extradition treaty ratified by the President and two-thirds
of the Senate; and (2) the Government’s request did not establish probable
cause. In the Matter of the Surrender of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, supra note
67, at *4. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5.]
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retains the discretion to deny surrender even after the surrender has been
certified by a U.S. Court.76 So while the provisions of the Security Council
supposedly are absolute, there are some loopholes. While domestic legislation
provides a legal basis for the surrender of the accused to the ICTR, many states
which have not enacted such legislation have turned over suspects to the
Tribunal.77
Recently, Italy refused to cooperate with the Rwanda Tribunal’s request
for the arrest of a Rwandese citizen claiming that its domestic legislation gives it
no legal basis to carry out the arrest.78 Italian authorities state that they would
have to issue an ad hoc decree to implement the international arrest warrant.
But while Italy justifies its refusal for surrender of the accused as contrary to its
laws, compliance with the Rwanda Tribunal’s requests is a fundamental rule of
international law. In the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, Article 27
states that a “party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as
justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”79 Furthermore, Rule 58 of the
Rwanda Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure in Evidence states that, “the obligations
laid down in Article 28 of the Statute shall prevail over any legal impediment to
76
77

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5.]
Press Release, Amnesty International, International Criminal Tribunal for

Rwanda’s Request for the Surrender of Muvunyi and Ndindiliyimana: A Step
Closer to Justice <http://www.amnesty-usa.org/news/2000/ 14700400.htm>

(Feb. 8, 2000). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 45.]
78
Press Release, Amnesty International, Italy Must Immediately Arrest

Rwandese Indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR]

<http://www.amnesty-usa.org/news/2001/italy_2_07172001.html> (Oct. 4,
2001). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 46.]
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the surrender or transfer of the accused or of a witness to the Tribunal which
may exist under the national law or extradition treaties of the State concerned.”80
If the State fails to surrender the accused, the Security Council may be notified.81

2. Limitations of National Tribunals
The Rwanda Tribunal was created specifically to prosecute those
responsible for the genocide in that country. Part of the reason the Rwanda
Tribunal has primacy of jurisdiction over these types of suspects is because its
existence stemmed from the need to bring these criminals to justice. Rwanda
knew the limitations of its national courts in trying to prosecute these suspects
and recognized that a competent judicial body needed to be implemented.82 At
least an international tribunal, as compared to a national court is “equally fair,
more distanced from the facts of the case and taking a broader view of the
matter,” with “impartial, independent and disinterested judges coming… from all
continents of the world.”83

3. Precedence of Primacy in the International Criminal

Tribunal for Yugoslavia

The principle of primacy was a relatively novel concept when it came into
79
80

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 46.]
GEOFF GILBERT, supra note 36, at 498. [Reproduced in accompanying

notebook at Tab 9.]
81
Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]
82
Bartram S. Brown, supra note 2, at 383. [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 18.]

24

force with the creation of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals. The
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), the predecessor of the
Rwanda Tribunal established its primacy under Article 9 of the ICTY Statute.84
The application of primacy doctrine first came into force with the trial of Dusko
Tadic. In this case, Tadic had been arrested and was awaiting trial in Germany
when the ICTY invoked its primacy and requested that Germany defer the case
to the ICTY.

85

Germany voluntarily complied and even enacted a law to

facilitate Tadic’s transfer to the Tribunal.86 Germany’s action the standard for
other countries to cooperate in the surrender of accused persons to the ICTY
and also provided the Rwanda Tribunal with a precedent through which it could
successfully invoke its primacy in obtaining accused persons from other
countries.

B. Setbacks to the Primacy Argument
1. The lack of primacy in the new International Criminal Court
Since the Rwanda Tribunal serves as a precedent for the new
International Criminal Court (ICC), it is important to see what provisions the
drafters of the ICC have implemented concerning the issue of the surrender or

83

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18.]

84

Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia
since 1991, annexed to S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR., reprinted in MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN
JUSTICE, 241 (1997). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4.]
85
Bartram S. Brown, supra note 2, at 383. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18.]
86
Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18.]
25

transfer of suspects to the ICC.87 In the new International Criminal Court the
transfer of the accused will not be compulsory for States; instead it will deal with
issues of complementarity.88 The issue of complementarity is not altogether
clear. It could mean that domestic courts should have primacy and the ICC
should only come in and fill in the gaps of jurisdiction or it may mean that the
domestic states and the ICC are equal and should complement each other in
terms of taking jurisdiction.89 Because of criticisms of the use of ad hoc
Tribunals, some members of the UN are looking to curb the power of the
Security Council’s power by basing the international tribunals on state consent.
On July 17, 1998 the Rome Conference approved The Draft Treaty for a
Permanent International Criminal Court. The jurisdiction of the ICC is narrower
than that of the States that have the jurisdiction with respect to the same
crimes.90 Its provisions seem to steer away from the doctrine of primacy held by
the Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda and instead gives the national courts
the initial opportunity to take the case.
Since the ICC is subject to the principle of complementarity, it thus only
acts as a supplement to national proceedings. According to this principle, the
Evo Popoff, supra note 67, at 378. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 19.]
88
Geoff Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders in International Law: Extradition and
Other Mechanisms 53 (1998). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]
89
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN. DOC. A/CONF.183/9
(Jul. 17, 1998) reprinted in GABRIELLE K. MCDONALD AND OLIVIA SWAAK-GOLDMAN,
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 449 (2000).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2.]
90
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, supra note 37. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 17.][
87
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ICC cannot take jurisdiction away from the national courts of cases pending on
the State’s dockets, or of cases in the process of being investigated except in
certain circumstances.91 These circumstances include situations in which the
national court system has collapsed or is genuinely unwilling to prosecute.92
While the concept of complementary was brought up as early as 1994, this
mechanism was criticized by some international law figures including Louise
Arbour, the previous prosecutor for the ICTR.93 She has argued that this worked
in favor of the rich and against the poor, underdeveloped countries.94
Consistent with these policies is the layout of the ICC’s procedural
guidelines concerning this issue. Whenever the ICC proposes an investigation
into a case or a case is referred to it by a State party, the ICC must give States
full notice and allow them the chance to prosecute the action at the domestic
level.95 The prosecutor must also seek a pre-trial chamber approval in order to
displace a state investigation.96 And even if this is successful, the State can then
appeal the pre-trial chamber decision.97 Within this framework, obtaining the
surrender of the accused will be considerably difficult for the international

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 89. [Reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 2.]
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Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2.]
93
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, supra note 37, at 68. [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 17.]
94
Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17.]
95
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 89. [Reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 2.]
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Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2.]
97
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prosecutor.
This shift in thinking on surrender and transfer procedures appears to
hamper the legitimacy of the principle of primacy that the Tribunal enjoys.98
However, Articles 86,87, 89, and 90 urge cooperation between the States and
the International Criminal Court.99 Under Article 90 when there are competing
requests between a requesting State and the ICC the State holding the accused
must give priority to the ICC unless it is bound by an international obligation to
extradite to that State.100 If the State is under an existing obligation, it has the
choice to determine whether it will surrender the accused to the Tribunal or the
requesting State.101

RUTH WEDGWOOD, NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMES (2000).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 16.]
99
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 89. [Reproduced
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100
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